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The present note analyzes the Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auction with arbitrarily many 
bidders with decreasing marginal valuations under complete information. We show that the 
game is solvable by iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies if the efficient 
allocation assigns at least one unit to every player and if bid increments are sufficiently small. 
In that unique equilibrium, bidders immediately reduce their demand to the efficient 
allocation, and the auction ends in the first round of bidding. 
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acknowledged. 1. introduction
Simultaneous Ascending Auctions have become an important device for allocat-
ing multiple units of goods1. They are also an important theoretical benchmark
for models of price formation and resource allocation2. Therefore, they deserve
a thorough game theoretic analysis.
The present note analyzes the Simultaneous Ascending Auction with arbitrarily
many bidders with decreasing marginal valuations under complete information.
We show that the game is solvable by iterated elimination of weakly dominated
strategies if the e±cient allocation assigns at least one unit to every player and
if bid increments are su±ciently small. In that unique equilibrium, bidders
immediately reduce their demand to the e±cient allocation, and the auction
ends immediately. We also show by examples that the assumptions we make
are necessary.
The practical relevance of demand reduction has been con¯rmed in a number of
Simultaneous Ascending Auctions3. The theoretical incentive for strategic de-
mand reduction is also well known4. It seems to be less well known that the low
price equilibrium is the unique equilibrium that survives iterated elimination of
weakly dominated strategies even if there are many bidders.
2. model
There are M ¸ 2 bidders who bid for N ¸ 2 objects. Bidders' marginal
valuations, vi
k;i = 1;:::;M;k = 1;:::;N, are strictly decreasing in the number




j is the absolute valuation of bidder i for k objects.
The auction is an open, ascending bid clock auction. There, the price clock goes
up by the ¯xed increment ¢ > 0, starting at 0, until there is no excess demand.
In each round t = 0;1;2;:::;, bidders simultaneously submit a bid ¯i(t) 2
f0;1;2;:::;Ng, i = 1;:::;M, which states how many units they demand at
1Starting with Radio Spectrum Auctions for the FCC, variants of the Simultaneous As-
cending Auction have been applied in various ¯elds as in electricity, gas, and environmental
markets, see, e.g. Cramton (2005), or Milgrom (2004) for recent accounts.
2Cf. Milgrom (2000).
3For example, Weber (1997) shows that demand reduction was at work in several FCC
spectrum auctions. And Grimm, Riedel, and Wolfstetter (2003) report the particularly spec-
tacular case of the second generation GSM spectrum auction in Germany. There, the two
dominant market players immediately reduced their demand to one half of the available radio
spectrum, and thus immediately ended the auction, after they had succeeded to crowd out
the two weaker bidders.
4See Cramton (2005), Ausubel and Milgrom (2002), Ausubel and Cramton (2002), Menezes
(1996) for dynamic auctions, and Back and Zender (1993), Wilson (1979) for sealed bid auc-
tions, and Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998) and Brusco and Lopomo (2002) for increas-
ing or °at marginal valuations.
2the given price t¢5. If the sum of bids does not exceed the supply N, the game
ends in round t and bidders pay t¢ for each of the ¯i(t) objects they get.
The demand function of bidder i in round t is di(t) = maxfk : vi
k ¸ ¢tg:
Aggregate demand is D(t) =
P
i di(t):




l . Marginal valuations do not lie on the price grid: for all t = 0;1;2;:::,
i = 1;:::;M and k = 1;:::;N we have vi
k 6= t¢.
This assumption ensures that there is a competitive solution where demand
equals supply in this model because aggregate demands starts at D(0) = MN,
goes to zero as t ! 1, and has no jumps greater than 1. The smallest
competitive price on the price grid determined by ¢ is given by T¤¢ with
T¤ ¢ = minft : D(t) = Ng : The unique e±cient allocation is ai ¢ =di(T¤);i =
1;:::;M.
3. uniqueness of equilibrium
Theorem 1 Assume that the e±cient allocations assigns at least one object to
each player: ai > 0 for all i = 1;:::;M. For ¢ su±ciently small the game can
be solved by iterated removal of weakly dominated strategies. In that solution,
the e±cient allocation (ai) obtains and the game ends in round 0 at price 0.





Proof : Denote by T0 = minft : D(t;(N;:::;N)) = 0g the ¯rst round when
aggregate demand is zero. For every s ¸ T0, the weakly dominant strategy in
the subgame that starts at s is ¯i(t) = 0 for all t ¸ s. We thus eliminate all
strategies which do not to bid zero in rounds t ¸ T0.
We now proceed in two steps. In Step 1, we show the only strategy that survives
iterated removal of weakly dominated strategies in subgames between T¤ and
T0 prescribes to bid one's demand. In Step 2 below, we show that in the early
rounds t = 0;:::;T¤, bidders reduce demand to their e±cient quantity ai.
Step 1. We proceed by backward induction. For t = T0, we know already that
the only strategies that survive have ¯i(s) = di(s) = 0 for s ¸ T0. Assume
now that for all s ¸ t + 1, we have eliminated all strategies that do not have
¯i(s) = di(s). In round t, bidding more than one's demand is weakly dominated
by bidding one's demand. Hence, we can eliminate all strategies that have
¯i(t) > di(t). After this elimination, we know that the game ends in round t
because
P
¯i(t) · D(t) · N. In that case, bidders are just price takers, and
take their optimal quantity, ¯i(t) = di(t).
5Bidding strategies may depend on the history of the game, of course. In order to keep the
notation simple, we do not make this dependence explicit.
3Step 2. We show by backward induction that only ¯i(t) = ai survives for
t = 0;:::;T¤. We know by Step 1, that the claim is true for t = T¤ since
¯i(T¤) = di(T¤) = ai. Assume now that for all s ¸ t + 1;s · T¤, we have
eliminated all strategies that do not have ¯i(s) = ai. Our ¯rst claim is that it
is weakly dominated to bid b < ai. A bid b < ai can only lead to a higher payo®,
if the game ends in round t with the bid b, and ends in round t+1 with the bid ai.
In that case, the bid b yields a payo® ¼b ¢ =wi(b)¡bt¢, whereas the bid ai leads
to a payo® ¼¤ ¢ =wi(ai)¡ai(t+1)¢. Since the demand of player i is at least ai in
round t, we have ¼i
b · ¼i
ai = wi(ai¡1)¡(ai¡1)t¢. Hence, it is enough to show
that g := ¼¤ ¡¼i(ai) > 0. Note that by de¯nition of T¤, there exists a player j
with (T¤ ¡1)¢ < vj(aj +1). Since t < T¤, we also have t¢ < vj(aj +1). From
this, we get g = vi(ai)¡t¢¡ai¢ > vi(ai)¡vj(aj +1)¡ai¢. By Assumption
1, we have vi(ai)¡vj(aj +1) > 0. Hence, for ¢ su±ciently small, g > 0 follows.
This shows that bidding less than ai is dominated by bidding ai.
We thus eliminate all strategies with ¯i(t) < ai. Given this, every bidder plays
at least his e±cient quantity aj;j = 1;:::;M. After this reduction, it is weakly
dominant to play ai in round t because bidding more just brings the game to
the next round where it ends with the allocation (aj). 2
Example 1 The theorem does not hold true if some players do not get objects
in the e±cient allocation. Consider the following example6 with two players
and two objects. Valuations are v1
1 = 101;v1
2 = 51, v2
1 = 47;v2
2 = 1, and the
increment is ¢ = 2. In this case, the strategy 'truthful bidding' ¯2(t) = d2(t)
cannot be eliminated because player 2 has no incentive to reduce demand to his
competitive allocation in early rounds here because he gets nothing in the e±-
cient allocation. Dropping out does not weakly dominate bidding one's demand.
On the contrary, for prices p = 2;4;6;:::;46 player 2's weakly dominant strat-
egy is to bid 1. Given this strategy, it is optimal for player 1 to reduce demand
to 1 in round 1 because he thus obtains a payo® of 99 whereas he can get only
56 by driving prices up to 48. Knowing that outcome, it is weakly dominant
to bid 1 in round 0 for both bidders. Note that the resulting allocation is not
e±cient but the equilibrium price is still 0.
On the other hand, if we increase the marginal valuation for the second ob-
ject of the strong bidder su±ciently, say v1
2 = 97, a similar argument shows
that the unique outcome that survives iterated elimination of weakly dominated
strategies implements the e±cient allocation at the competitive price 48. The
resulting allocation is e±cient, but the price is not 0. However, if one intro-
duces participation fees or bidding costs in this kind of example, the weak bidder
drops out immediately, and we get again zero prices.
6Similar examples can be found in Ausubel and Milgrom (2002) and Milgrom (2000).
4Example 2 The assumption that ¢ be small enough is necessary. Consider a
two player auction with 4 objects and valuations v1
1 = 101, v2
1 = 91, v1
3 = 61,
v1
4 = 11 and v2
1 = 103, v2
2 = 63, v2
3 = 13, and v2
4 = 1. The increment is ¢ = 2.
The e±cient allocation assigns two objects to each player. The competitive
price is 62. At and above this price, every player plays his demand. However,
at price p = 60 in round t = 30, bidding 1 is not weakly dominated by bidding
2 for player 2. The payo® matrix is (neglecting the bid 0)
1 2 3
1 41,43 41,46 41, -1
2 72,43 72,46 68,42
3 73,43 68,42 68, 42
The game has two strict Nash equilbria: (3;1) and (2;2).
4. conclusions
The present paper has not only shown that low price outcomes may be an
equilibrium in multi-unit auctions. We showed that the low price equilibria
that implement the e±cient allocation at the minimum bid is rationalizable as
the only equilibrium that survives iterated elimination of dominated strategies.
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